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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Credit markets are capricious and susceptible to occasional breakdown. A more commonly ob-
served phenomenon that accompanies credit market distress is the mismatch between borrowers
and lenders: there is both an excess demand for and an excess supply of loanable funds.1 For
example, Kanoh and Pumpaisanchai (2006) ﬁnd the coexistence of excess supply of bank loans to
large and medium ﬁrms and excess demand by small ﬁrms in Japan over the past decade. More-
over, Hwang, Jiang and Wang (2007) document excessive lending to nonperforming chaebols (large
conglomerates) in Korea, whereas similar problems have arisen more recently in the U.S. subprime
mortage markets in which excessive loans have been directed to low quality borrowers. In the pres-
ence of credit mismatch, funds remain under-used despite the existence of potentially proﬁtable but
unexploited investment opportunities. This not only generates undesirable social ineﬃciencies, but
also increases the liklihood of credit-market breakdown.
Despite their important macroeconomic consequences and policy implications, these aforemen-
tioned credit-market issues have not been thoroughly studied within an integrated theoretical fram-
work. In particular, most explanations for the turbulence of credit markets that have been advanced
in the literature are essentially based on theories of asymmetric information regarding borrowers’
types or unobserved actions. Yet such informational asymmetries focus only on the unfulﬁlled de-
mand for credit. They, by themselves, can neither account for credit mismatch nor the role mismatch
plays in determining credit-market participation and tightness (measured by the diﬃculty of both
borrowers and lenders in establishing credit relationships) as well as the likelihood of breakdown.
To explore these issues we consider an environment in which informational frictions (of the type
emphasized in the credit rationing literature) coexist with the frictions associated with matching
borrowers and lenders in a decentralized loan market.2 This dynamic matching framework is con-
1One may think of the episode delineated in William Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice as an example of credit
mismatch. Speciﬁcally, the loan provided by the money lender (Shylock, who practices the unpopular “usury”) to
the merchant (Antonio) remains idle (to back up his friend, Bassanio, in his pursue a highly demanding girl, Portia),
leaving potentially productive borrowers unfunded.
2While not mutually exclusive, the diﬀerence between the two frictions is that the former emphasizes the limits on
1sistent with three observations that are prevalent even in well-functioning creit markets. First,
there is a continuous ﬂo wi n t oa n do u to ft h ec r e d i tm a r k e tb yb o r r o w i n gﬁrms, mostly small and
medium-sized, that face entry barriers (entry frictions). Second, borrowing ﬁrms must race against
time as they search for funding opportunities while lenders also must invest time and resources to
convert their idle funds into active investments (search frictions). Third, part of the costs incurred
in identifying viable credit relationships are information-based; lenders may face considerable risk
for they cannot be sure of the borrowing ﬁrms’ investment outcomes (informational frictions in the
form of moral hazard).
While locating sources of funding has been recognized as a paramount problem facing exitsting
and would-be entrepreneurs, as documented by Blanchﬂower and Oswald (1998), only recently has it
been explicitly recognized that the localized and heterogenous nature of the market for information-
intensive loanable funds shares many characteristics of a search market.3 Our paper contributes
to a small but growing literature that advocates a search theoretic framework to model credit
market activity. For example, Craig and Haubrich (2006) argues that the credit market may have
“as strong a claim to search frictions as the labor market.” Complementing the empirical work of
Dell’Arriccia and Garibaldi (2005), they document evidence regarding gross credit ﬂows via loan
creation and destruction and the entry and exit of banks. They further demonstrate that a simple
search theoretic model of lending may capture the gross lending ﬂows evident in the data. Within the
search theoretic framework, Den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2003) illustrate how liquidity shocks
are propagated and ampliﬁed in credit markets when credit relationships can be renegotiated. While
Acemoglu (2001) and Wasmer and Weil (2004) study how credit market imperfections interact with
labor market frictions, Silveira and Wright (2006) analyze the match between venture capitalists
and entrepreneurs and characterize equilibrium returns. Two studies that most resembles ours
are Diamond (1990) and Becsi, Li, and Wang (2005). Diamond characterizes bilateral exchange
in credit markets with exogenously ﬁxed matching probabilities and populations of borrowers and
lenders. Our earlier work focuses on examining how the entry of heterogeneous borrowers can aﬀect
the aggregate composition of borrowers under perfect information. In the present paper, we not
only endogenize matching probabilities and market participation, but also include informational
frictions. Under this generalized setup, we show that endogenous entry can interact with search,
knowledge and the latter emphasizes the limits on time.
3For example, search costs on the part of lenders can be loosely thought of as encompassing the time element of
ex ante screening in the spirit of Boyd and Prescott (1986). Alternatively, localized creditors tend to specialize in a
particular type of lending and must sort through the various heterogenous investment opportunities to identify the
most suitable match.
2matching and incentive frictions to aﬀect the extent of credit rationing as well as the possibility of
credit mismatch and breakdown.
The basic structure we propose is one in which borrowers and lenders choose whether or not to
participate in a decentralized loan market where search for bilateral credit relationships is costly.
Some participating borrowers and lenders form credit relationships that enable ﬁnancing of invest-
ment projects which yield a productive rate of return. These returns are divided up between the
lender in the form of an interest payment and the borrower in the form of residual proﬁts. The
incentive frictions that arise from asymmetric information allow the possibility of borrowers to ab-
scond with the borrowed funds subject to a default cost. Hence, when loan contracts are negotiated
they must be incentive compatible to overcome this moral hazard problem and credit rationing,
where borrowers receive fewer funds than desired, may emerge endogenously. In equilibrium, opti-
mal loan contracts and the extent of credit rationing are determined jointly with market liquidity
(aggregate lending), borrower market participation (endogenous entry), and the tightness of the
credit market (the excess demand for loans as measured by the ratio of unmatched borrowers to
unmatched lenders). Hence, the interaction of entry, search, and informational frictions provides
a rich structure with which to capture the ﬂow of credit along both the intensive and extensive
margins.
We ﬁnd that the nature of the optimal incentive-compatible contract in equilibrium varies with
aggregate fundamentals as represented by borrower productivity. If productivity falls below a
threshold that is determined by default costs, credit markets break down and cease to exist. When
productivity begins to exceed this threshold, an active credit market arises but ﬁrms will be rationed
unless lenders are suﬃciently patient. Even high productivity may be associated with rationing if
t h er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c ei ss u ﬃciently low or the length of the loan contract period is suﬃciently
short. Intuitively, a low rate of time preference raises the present discounted value of absconding
with borrowed funds and a short contract duration lowers the value of the match for a borrower who
must search again after the match is dissolved. Also, we ﬁnd that credit market tightness and the
extent of credit rationing are positively related when entry is exogenous. However, with endogenous
entry, there generally does not exist a monotonic relationship between the two. That is, credit may
continue to be rationed in a market where it is relatively easy for borrowers to locate lenders if high
equilibrium interest rates induce ﬁrm exit out of the loanable funds market. Finally, we show that
incentive frictions and entry frictions are important in determining the extent of credit rationing,
while entry and search frictions are important for understanding the likelihood of credit market
breakdown. Moreover, eliminating entry barriers can completely rule-out information-based credit
3rationing in equilibrium, while search frictions continue to aﬀect whether or not credit markets
fail. Intuitively, competition by banks weakens their bargaining position and increases the extent
of credit rationing by reducing their ability to dictate loan contract terms.
2T h e B a s i c E n v i r o n m e n t
Time is continuous. There are two types of economic agents, those endowed with resources (“lenders”)
and those endowed with an “investment” technology which uses those resources to generate a posi-
tive return (“borrowers”). Our model focuses on the loanable funds market where available funds
provided by a continuum of lenders are channeled to a continuum of potential borrowers through a
decentralized credit market. Let NL and NB represent the mass of lenders and borrowers in this
environment. For convenience, we normalize the measure of lenders to unity. Lenders and borrow-
ers (bilaterally) meet with each other for the purpose of establishing a credit relationship and the




where m measures ﬂow matches, m0 > 0 indicates the eﬃcacy of credit market matching, and M
is strictly increasing and concave, satisfying the constant-returns-to-scale property, the standard
Inada conditions, and the boundary conditions M(0,·)=M(·,0) = 0.W e d e ﬁne Ni
u to be the
number of unmatched agents and Ni
m as the number of matched agents of type i where i = L,B.
By normalizing the mass of lenders to unity, we have: NL
u + NL
m =1 . A central feature of the loan
market highlighted by our model is that market liquidity is determined by credit market tightness.
Given the populations of lenders and borrowers, a measure of credit market tightness in our




u . Intuitively, if
τ is high, then there are many potential borrowers relative to lenders with idle funds. Because it is
more diﬃcult for borrowers to locate potential lenders under these circumstances, we say that the
credit market is “tight” from the perspecticve of borrowers.4
Utility generated from consumption is assumed to be linear for both types of agents. Since the
focus of this paper is on how credit market frictions and market liquidity aﬀect credit arrangements
between borrowers and lenders rather than the intertemporal consumption and saving decisions of
4In the appendix, we provide an alternative measure of credit market tightness — the “capital unemployment rate.”
We show that the capital unemployment rate is a monotone increasing function of τ; thus, our arguments remain
valid under this alternative measure.
4households, this simplifying assumption is adopted without loss of generality for our purpose. An
unmatched lender consumes his ﬂow endowment ω as he searches for borrowers with whom to trade
this endowment for the promise of a future payment. A borrower begins the search period with
only his investment technology and searches for potential lenders to ﬁnance their project. Lenders
contact borrowers at a rate of μ, while borrowers contact lenders at a rate of η. Due to asymmetric
information about the borrower’s behavior, the lender is unsure about whether the borrower will
invest in a productive project or abscond (take the money and run). Thus, once a borrower and a
lender meet, the lender will set an incentive compatible loan contract to prevent the borrower from
absconding with the funds. The contract speciﬁes a gross interest payment, R,a n dt h ef r a c t i o no f
available funds actually lent out, q ≤ 1. When this loan contract is established, the lender gives
up a portion of the endowment, qω, to the borrower and consumes the residual portion (1 − q)ω
while waiting for the end of the contract period. In the meantime the borrowed funds are used to
implement production which provides the borrower a ﬂow return of Aqω where A>0 represents the
exogenous level of productivity. The contract period ends when borrowers and lenders are separated
at which time the lender pays the borrower an amount Rqω (i.e., loan repayment). The exogenous
separation rate is given by δ, and hence the length of the contract period is given by 1/δ and the
corresponding gross interest rate is given by δR. After both members of the match become
separated, they re-enter the pool of unmatched borrowers and lenders and again search for credit
opportunities.
If borrowers in this model know with certainty that the loan will be repaid, our preferences imply
that it will be optimal for the lender to set q =1and lend all of the endowment to the borrower
in exchange for the future payment. However, due to unobserved motives, borrowers in our model
may choose to default on the loan and abscond without repayment. When this occurs, the defaulter
bears two costs. First, we assume that the defaulter is excluded from any future credit transactions.
Second, we assume that the borrower must forfeit a real resource cost that is measured as a fraction
θ of total loanable funds. This cost is meant to capture the outside penalty of default and may
represent legal or institutional features. A legal or monitoring system is considered to be tougher
when the default cost higher. This moral hazard feature is what may cause loanable funds to be
rationed (i.e., q<1). That is, lenders will use this quantity rationing feature of the loan contract
so as to insure incentive compatibility and repayment.
We can now characterize the dynamic problem facing borrowers and lenders in our economy.
Let Ju and Jm denote the lender’s value associated with being in the unmatched (u) and matched
5(m) states. These asset values can be expressed as:
rJu = ω + μ(Jm − Ju) (2)
rJm =( 1− q)ω + δ[Rqω +( Ju − Jm)] (3)
where r>0 is the rate of time preference. Equation (2) says that the ﬂow value associated with
an unmatched lender is the ﬂow of consumption from his endowment and arrival rate of borrowers
times the net value gained when a loan contract is implemented and the match is formed. Equation
( 3 )s a y st h a tt h eﬂow value associated with a matched lender is the ﬂow of consumption of the
residual endowment and the rate at which the contract expires times the interest payment and net
value of returning to the unmatched pool.
Similarly, let Πu and Πm denote the borrowers’s value associated with being in the unmatched
and matched states, respectively. Their asset values in the two states are:
rΠu = η(Πm − Πu) (4)
rΠm = Aqω + δ[−Rqω +( Πu − Πm)] (5)
Equation (4) simply states that the ﬂow value associated with an unmatched borrower is the rate
at which they contact lenders times the net value gained when becoming matched with a lender.
Equation (5) says that the ﬂow value associated with a matched borrower is the stream of returns the
borrower obtains from implementing the investment project and the value associated with separation
which occurs at rate δ. When this occurs, the borrower makes the interest payment Rqω,g a i n s
the state of returning to the unmatched borrowers’ pool, and looses the state of being a matched
borrower.5
Subtracting (2) from (3) gives us the lenders’ value of being matched relative to being unmatched
as:
Jm − Ju =
(δR− 1)qω
r + δ + μ
(6)
Notice that equation (6) implies that a necessary condition for an active loan market requires
Jm − Ju > 0 or δR > 1. Otherwise, the economy will degenerate into an autarkic state where no
credit activity occurs. We will assume that this condition holds.
5For simplicity we have assumed that borrowers do not have any assets. More generally, if borrowers also have an
asset ω
B, e q u a t i o n( 3 )m u s tb em o d i ﬁed to rΠu = ω
B + η (Πm − Πu). If these assets are jointly productive with
the endowment of the lender then equation (4) changes to rΠm = A(qω + ω
B)+δ[−Rqω +( Πu − Πm)].A n o t h e r
possibility (that is also beyond the scope of this paper) is that borrower’s assets could be used as collateral for loans.
For a discussion of these and related issues see, for instance, Hart and Moore (1994).
6Similarly, subtracting (4) from (5) gives us the borrowers’ value of being matched relative to
being unmatched as:
Πm − Πu =
(A − δR)qω
r + δ + η
(7)
We note that the relative values given by (6) and (7) are aggregate expressions. However, each
individual borrower is atomistic and take their unmatched value Πu a sg i v e nw h e ne v a l u a t i n gt h e i r
matched value. If we take this into account, we can rewrite (5) as:
Πm =
(A − δR)qω + δΠu
r + δ
(8)
In the presence of the moral hazard problem, a loan contract must be incentive compatible to
eliminate borrowers’ default in equilibrium. In the benchmark setup, we follow Sappington (1983),
Benerjee and Newman (1993) and Fender and Wang (2003), assuming that the moral hazard problem
take the form of absconding. This means that incentive competibility is met if the value associated






where the left hand side of (9) gives the present discounted value of absconding as the discounted
value of the funds borrowed net of the cost expressed as a fraction θ of the loan and the penalty







) − (A − δR)
¸
≤ δΠu (10)
From (10) we see that an increase in the loan interest rate δR or an increase in the total quantity of
the loan qω increases the likelihood of absconding. An incentive compatible loan contract is deﬁned
as a pair (q,R) such that (10) is satisﬁed.
When borrowers and lenders meet, they bargain over the terms of the contract. We will assume
that the outcome of this bargaining game is consistent with the Nash bargaining solution where
the contract (q,R) is designed to maximize the joint surplus of the funds suppliers and demanders
S =( Jm −Ju)1/2(Πm −Πu)1/2, subject to the incentive compatibility constraint (10), q ∈ [0,1] and
R ≥ 0. Using (6) and (7), maximization of the joint surplus implies dS
dq > 0 and, from dS
dR =0 ,o n e
6There are two interesting alternative setups for the default process. First borrowers can use the loanable funds to
produce before absconding, and second is where credit market participation is permitted after payment of the default
penalty. We consider these alternative speciﬁcations later in Section 7.2 and compare the results with our benchmark
setup.
7obtains:
δRqω =( Aqω − rΠu)Γ +( 1− Γ) (11)
where Γ ≡
r+δ+μ
2(r+δ)+μ is monotone increasing function of μ. Notice that if the pair (q,R)i sn o t
incentive constrained (that is, the incentive compatibility constraint is not binding), then it is
always optimal for the lender to loan out his entire endowment: q =1 .
3 Characterization of the Loan Contract
We proceed by describing the optimal loan contract in the presence of incentive frictions that cause
a moral hazard problem. The optimal contract must be incentive compatible and satisfy the Nash
bargaining condition. Both conditions can be represented in an intuitive graphical fashion. The
following provides a formal deﬁnition of the optimal loan contract.
Deﬁnition 1. An optimal loan contract is a pair (R,q) such that
(i) q =1and R solves (11) if (10) does not bind, or otherwise,
(ii) q<1 and R solves (11) and (10) with equality.
We deﬁne this latter case as a situation where the optimal loan contract is characterized by
credit rationing. Deﬁning Q ≡ qω, we can then express the optimal loan contract in terms of the








Γ +( 1− Γ) (12)




where B ≡ A − (1 − θ)r+δ
r .
The determination of the optimal incentive compatible loan contract can be characterized graph-
ically in (Q,δR) space with the origin deﬁned as Q =0and δR =1 . We construct the graph in
three steps.
First, we plot the surplus maximization condition (12) and call it the SM locus. This locus is
upward-sloping and concave with a horizontal intercept QSM = rΠu
A−1 and slope ΓrΠu
Q2 .A no p t i m a l
loan contract must be along this SM locus. The slope of the SM locus can be interpreted in terms
of the bargaining power of borrowers versus lenders. For example, a steep SM curve, resulting from
a faster arrival rate of borrowers, μ, or long loan contract period, low δ, increases the bargaining
8power of lenders. Hence lenders can demand a higher interest rate (δR) for a given increase in the
loan quantity Q and this implies a steeper SM locus.
Second, we plot the incentive compatibility condition (13) with equality in (Q,δR) space and call
it the IC locus. This locus is downward-sloping and convex to the origin such that limQ−→0 δR = ∞
and limQ−→∞ δR = B and has slope −δΠu
Q2 .A l s o , f o r B<1, IC has a horizontal intercept at
QIC = δΠu
1−B.A n y ( Q,δR) in the area below the IC locus satisﬁes the incentive compatibility
constraint.
Third is the property that an optimal loan contract must always have q as large as possible
within the feasible range [0,1]. Formally, we can plot Q = ω as the upper bound for q. This means
that if an optimal loan contract exists, it must be on the part of the SM locus that is below the
IC locus and to the left of the Q = ω locus with the highest q. The existence of an active loanable
funds market for all δR > 1 requires the condition that A>1 a n dt h i si ss a t i s ﬁed for a suﬃciently
productive economy.
Figure 1 segments our characterization of the optimal loan contract into three cases, depending
on the relative position of the SM and IC loci. Case I indicates a situation when the SM locus is
everywhere below IC. Hence all combinations of (Q,δR) along the SM locus are incentive compatible
and the optimal loan contract is the one with the highest value of q,i m p l y i n gQ∗ = ω and the absence
of credit rationing (see point E).
When the IC locus crosses the SM locus as in Case II, the amount of funds available in the
economy is central for characterizing the optimal incentive compatible loan contract. When the
amount of funds available is low (say, ω = ωL), the optimal loan contract represented by (QL,δR L)
is at point EL where credit rationing is absent (i.e., q =1 ). However, when the amount of funds
available is high with ω = ωH, the incentive compatibility constraint is now binding. As a conse-
quence, there will be a unique optimal loan contract represented by (QH,δR H). In this case credit
rationing emerges because the highest q attainable is strictly less than one (see point EH where
QH <ω H). Intuitively, loaning out a higher quantity of available funds increases the incentives
for the borrower to abscond and leads to a binding incentive compatibility constraint. Since credit
rationing only occurs conditionally, depending on a suﬃciently large endowment, we will refer to
this as a case of “conditional” credit rationing.
Finally, Case III shows that if the IC locus crosses the horizontal axis at a point lower than
SM, there exists no incentive compatible combination of (Q,δR) and no underwriting of a loan
contract. This is the “non-active” credit market outcome and is comparable to a credit market
breakdown. After completely characterizing the steady-state equilibrium, we will return to a more
9detailed analysis of the conditions consistent with each of these possible equilibrium outcomes.
4 Steady-State Equilibrium
The previous section discussed the properties of incentive compatible optimal loan contracts given
the rates by which borrowers and lenders are matched. We now close the model by characterizing
the steady state process by which lenders and borrowers meet. This will in turn pin down the
equilibrium contact rates by which agents are matched, the steady state population of matched and
unmatched borrowers and lenders, and hence equilibrium credit market tightness.
The ﬂow of lenders into the state of being matched is given by μNL
u and the ﬂow of borrowers
into the matched state is given by ηNB
u . In equilibrium, the ﬂow of funds supplied must be equal
to the ﬂow of funds demanded:
μNL
u = ηNB
u = m (14)




u , we can use (1) and the constant returns
property of the matching technology to rewrite the steady state condition in terms of our tightness
measure:
μ = ητ = m0M(1,τ) (15)





is decreasing in τ; moreover, both μ and η are increasing in m0,
μ
η = τ (independent of m0),
limτ→0 μ(τ)=0and limτ→∞ η(τ)=0 . This relationship is often referred to as the Beveridge
curve in the search equilibrium literature. For labor markets the curve relates the unemployment
rate to the vacancy rate (or establishes a relationship between the associated ﬂow contact rates),
while for credit markets we relate the capital unemployment rate to a measure of how much idle
funds there are in the system. We are now able to deﬁne a steady state loanable funds equilibrium
under exogenous and endogenous entry.
Deﬁnition 2. Given credit market tightness τ,asteady-state loanable funds equilibrium
with exogenous entry of borrowers is a tuple (Q∗,δR ∗,μ ∗,η∗) satisfying:
(i) the optimal incentive compatible loan contract (12) and (13), and
(ii) the Beveridge curve relationship (15) and (16).
10Finally, we consider a loanable funds equilibrium with endogenous entry. From (7) and (8), we
can eliminate Πm to obtain the unmatched value facing each potential borrower:
Πu =
η




There is a large mass of potential borrowers. Borrower entry into the loan market is determined
by assuming each borrower faces a ﬁxed cost v for setting up the investment technology. By
equilibrium entry, borrowers enter into the unmatched pool of borrowers until their unmatched
value is driven down to the entry cost, or,
Πu = v (18)
Using the Beveridge curve relationship, we can substitute (17) into (18) to yield:
η(τ)
r + δ + η(τ)
(AQ − δRQ)=rv (19)












This is referred to as the ex ante zero proﬁt (ZP) locus, which is strictly increasing and strictly
concave in (Q,τ) space with a horizontal intercept rv
A−1.7
Deﬁnition 3. A steady-state loanable funds equilibrium with endogenous entry of bor-
rowers is a triplet (Q∗,δR ∗,τ∗)t h a ts a t i s ﬁes:
(i) the optimal incentive compatible loan contract (12) and (13), and
(ii) the Beveridge curve relationship and ex ante zero proﬁt condition given by (20).
Figure 2 provides an illustration of this steady-state equilibrium with endogenous entry by
combining Case II from Figure 1 in the top panel with the ZP locus in the bottom panel (whereby
we note that this locus has the same horizontal intercept as the SM locus). Thus, a loanable funds
equilibrium is determined in a recursive manner. The optimal incentive compatible contract pins
down the equilibrium (Q∗,δR ∗). Then the ZP locus determines equilibrium entry and hence the
market tightness measure τ∗ that is consistent with the optimal contract.
7As u ﬃcient condition for the concavity of the ZP locus is given by the envelope condition
(1/τ)MHH
MH > −2.F o r
example, this is trivially satisﬁed when the matching technology M (·) is Cobb-Douglas.
11Once this triplet is determined, it is straightforward to derive the steady state populations of
matched and unmatched borrowers and lenders. From (16) and (15), we have η∗ and μ∗, respectively.
Because the inﬂow of unmatched lenders being matched must equal the outﬂow of matched lenders
being separated: μ∗NL
u = δNL
m. Substituting the population identity, NL
u + NL
m =1 ,i n t ot h i s








δ + μ∗ (21)
From this it is easy to see that the equilibrium number of unmatched borrowers is NB∗
u = τ∗NL∗
u .
It is straightforward to verify that when a loanable funds equilibrium exists, it is unique. Hence,
in general, not only does the optimal loan contract determine market tightness and liquidity, but
market tightness in turn also aﬀects the optimal loan contract.
5 Equilibrium Credit Rationing and Market Breakdown
We now analyze the properties of the steady-state loanable funds equilibrium. Unless otherwise
speciﬁed, the following applies to both equilibrium with exogenous and endogenous entry. We
identify the conditions that are consistent with existence of the steady state and diﬀerentiate between
three possible regimes. Speciﬁcally, based on the equations underlying Figure 2, we have:
Proposition 1. (Steady-state Loanable Funds Equilibrium) A steady-state loanable funds equilib-
rium features one of the following three outcomes:
(i) If (A − 1) < (1 − θ), then there does not exist an incentive compatible loan contract and the
loan market is non-active (Case III).
(ii) If (1 − θ) ≤ (A − 1) < 2(1 − θ) and ω is suﬃciently high, then there exists a credit rationing
equilibrium with q<1 (Case II).
(iii) If 2(1 − θ) ≤ (A − 1) and ω is suﬃciently high, then,
a. there exists a credit rationing equilibrium with q<1 for r<r ≡
(1−θ)[2δ+μ]
(A−1)−2(1−θ) (Case II);
b. the incentive compatibility constraint never binds and the equilibrium loan contract is not
rationed for r ≥ r (Case I).
Proof: See Appendix. ¤
12Proposition 1 outlines the region of the parameter space consistent with the various possible
equilibrium outcomes discussed in the previous section. This Proposition has a very intuitive inter-
pretation and can be divided into three cases as illustrated by Figure 1. Loosely, if the productivity
of the investment project is suﬃciently low relative to the incentive friction, then there will always
the incentive to abscond for any loan contract along the SM locus. In this case (Case III), there is
no active loanable funds equilibrium and the loan market breaks down. Once productivity begins
to exceed a threshold level (Case II), lenders begin channeling loanable funds to borrowers, but
the quantity is rationed. Finally, if productivity is suﬃciently high, then whether or not there is
rationing can be expressed in terms of the rate of time preference. In particular, if the rate of time
preference is suﬃciently small, then the present discounted value of consumption generated from
absconding for the borrower becomes greater than the value of being matched in the loanable funds
market. Lenders must continue to ration loans so that the incentive compatibility binds (Case II).
If, on the other hand, the rate of time preference is very large, there will never be an incentive for
the borrower to abscond and all loan contracts are incentive compatible (Case I).
Proposition 1 establishes that credit rationing of productive ﬁrms depends on a threshold r.
Next, we consider the underlying changes to this threshold that make credit rationing more likely.
Proposition 2. (Duration of Loan Contract) Suppose that the investment project is suﬃciently
productive such that (A − 1) > 2(1 − θ). Then in a steady-state loanable funds equilibrium, an
increase in the duration of the loan contract (lower δ) leads to an increase in the set of incentive
compatible contracts and an increase in the loan market equilibrium interest rate (δR). If the latter
eﬀect dominates the former, credit rationing is likely to occur.
Proof: Observe that limQ→∞ δRSM and limQ→∞ δRIC are decreasing in δ. ¤
A longer contract duration (low δ) increases the set of incentive compatible contracts since the
borrower can enjoy the productive beneﬁts supported by the loanable funds for a greater period of
time. This is captured by an upward shift of the IC locus. However, a longer contract duration
also makes the match more valuable to the borrower and biases the bargaining power towards
lenders. Consequently, the SM locus shifts upwards as well. In Case II, the market equilibrium
loan rate increases in both the case where there is no rationing (ω=ωL) and when there is rationing
(ω=ωH). Whether or not credit rationing is more likely depends upon whether the bargaining eﬀect
dominates the incentive compatibility eﬀect. If the bargaining eﬀect dominates, then the a longer
contract period both increases rationing and the equilibrium loan rate.
We next study the linkage between the tightness of the credit market and credit rationing in an
13exogenous entry equilibrium and one where borrower entry is endogenized. In particular, we ﬁnd:
Proposition 3.( Market Tightness versus Credit Rationing)
(i) In an exogenous entry equilibrium satisfying Deﬁnition 2, there is a positive relationship be-
tween market tightness (τ) and the likelihood of credit rationing. For all r>0,t h e r ee x i s t s
τ<∞ suﬃciently large such that equilibrium credit rationing will occur.
(ii) In an endogenous entry equilibrium satisfying Deﬁnition 3, there is no necessary monotonic
relationship between credit market tightness and the extent of credit rationing.
Part (i) follows directly from Proposition 1. From (15) an (exogenous) increase in τ increases
the frequency at which lenders meet borrowers, μ.S i n c e∂r
∂μ > 0 it follows that an increase in market
tightness expands the set of feasible rates of time preference consistent with the credit rationing
equilibrium. As τ becomes arbitrarily large, r →∞. To see the intuition behind part (i) suppose
that the initial steady state equilibrium is given by Case I. In this case, every loan contract that
maximizes the joint match surplus of borrowers and lenders is incentive compatible. The Beveridge
curve relationship given by (15) implies that an increase in market tightness increases the rate that
lenders contact borrowers. This increases the threat point and bargaining power of lenders when
negotiating the loan contract. As a result, the SM locus shifts upwards and this shrinks the set of Q
and δR combinations consistent with incentive compatibility. If the increase in market tightness is
suﬃciently large, IC will eventually intersect with the SM locus and credit will begin to be rationed
at a higher equilibrium interest rate. Thus, we are m o r el i k e l yt os e ec r e d i tr a t i o n e di na ni l l i q u i d
credit market where it is diﬃcult for borrowers to ﬁnd loan opportunities.
To illustrate part (ii), consider the following comparative steady state analysis of an increase in
funds matching eﬃcacy (m0) that improves matching for both lenders and borrowers in Case II.
This is illustrated in Figure 3. Under our funds matching framework, a rise of m0 raises the eﬀective
contact rate of funds suppliers Γ and strengthens their bargaining power. As a consequence, joint
surplus maximization grants relatively higher returns to the suppliers, implying an increase in R for
each given value Q. That is, the SM locus rotates upwards. From the ZP relationship, an increase
in mo will raise the matching rate η(τ) of borrowers. For a given Q determined by the optimal loan
contract, more potential borrowers enter and hence the loan market becomes tighter. That is, the
ZP locus twists toward the vertical axis.
For the case of ω = ωL where the incentive compatibility constraint is not binding, the equi-
librium loan rate rises as market participation (or tightness) increases. For the case of ω = ωH,
14rationing increases in response to the increased entry of potential borrowers and a higher equilib-
rium loan rate is required to satisfy incentive compatibility. However, the increased severity of credit
rationing reduces potential borrowers’ expected proﬁt, thereby decreasing their entry. Due to this
latter opposing eﬀect, the net change in the tightness of the loan market is ambiguous. Hence, an
observed increase in credit rationing need not imply increased tightness in the credit market.
6 The Role of Market Frictions
We next explicitly consider the impact of search frictions (ﬁnite m0), market entry frictions (v), and
incentive frictions (θ) on the structure of optimal lending arrangements and steady state equilibrium
in the loanable funds market. Each of these frictions is considered separately so that their relative
contributions to explaining credit rationing and market breakdown can be isolated and analyzed.
6.1 Search Frictions
Without search frictions, credit market participants do not have to wait to set up a credit arrange-
ment. When matches are instantaneous, we have
Proposition 4. (Search Frictions) In the absence of search frictions, the equilibrium loan contract
and the existence of equilibrium credit rationing are independent of market tightness.
Proof: The absence of search frictions occurs in the limiting case where m0 −→ ∞. The Beveridge
curve relation implies that while μ and η −→ ∞, τ ≡ μ/η will remain bounded by the constant
returns to scale property of the matching technology. Using these and limm0−→∞ Γ =1 , the steady
state equilibrium conditions (12), (13), and (20) are now given by δR = A − rv
Q, δR ≤ B + δv
Q,a n d
Q = rv
A−1(1 + τ), respectively. Since τ no longer appears in the SM and IC loci, the optimal loan
contract is independent of market thickness. ¤
This result says that search frictions are crucial for a linkage between market tightness, the
optimal loan contract, and credit rationing. If borrowers and lenders instantaneously match and
enter into a lending agreement, their relative bargaining position will not be aﬀected by the tightness
of the market. In this situation the only equilibrium outcomes are the conditional (Case II) and
non-active (Case III) steady states. Because of the entry costs on the borrower’s side, a reduction
in search frictions increases the relative ease with which lenders locate borrowers. As in Proposition
3, this causes an upward shift in the SM locus. As the loan equilibrium interest rate rises, lenders
15must ration in order to keep the contract incentive compatible. The absence of search frictions in
general equilibrium can be seen as a limiting case of this sequence of these events.
6.2 Entry Frictions
Here we consider costless entry of borrowers into the credit market. Under these circumstances, the
demand for funds is perfectly elastic and we establish:
Proposition 5. (Entry Frictions) In the absence of entry frictions, there does not exist a credit ra-
tioning equilibrium. Equilibrium in the loan market is characterized by either an active no rationing
loanable funds market or a non-active loan market.
Proof: The absence of ﬁrm entry frictions occurs in the limiting case where v → 0.S i n c e
there is now unrestricted borrower entry, the steady state conditions described (12), (13) are now
given by δR = Γ(A − 1) + 1, δR ≤ B. Existence of an active loanable funds market requires
Γ(A − 1) + 1 <B= A − (1 − θ)(r+δ
r ). Satisfaction of this condition implies that all combinations
of (Q,δR) along the (horizontal) SM locus is incentive compatible and there is no credit rationing,
q =1 . ¤
To obtain intuition behind this result, suppose that the initial steady state equilibrium is given
by the active no rationing equilibrium of Case I. In this situation, B>Γ(A − 1) + 1. Lower entry
frictions encourages the entry of borrowers and this drives down their unmatched value. This rotates
the SM locus clockwise as lenders take advantage of their increased bargaining power. At the same
time, a lower unmatched value for the borrower must be compensated by a decrease in the loan rate
or loan quantity to maintain incentive compatibility. In the limiting case as these costs vanish, the
SM and IC loci are horizontal with SM everywhere below IC. No contract that oﬀers an interest
rate above B will be incentive compatible and no interest rate above Γ(A−1)+1 will be consistent
with the optimal loan contract. Hence, there will only be an active no rationing equilibrium.
To show that credit rationing disappears with free entry, suppose that the initial steady state
equilibrium is given by the conditional equilibrium of Case II. In this situation, B<Γ(A − 1) + 1.
Lower entry frictions encourages the entry of borrowers and this drives down their unmatched value.
As lenders take advantage of their increased bargain i n gp o w e r ,t h ei n t e r e s tr a t ec o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h e
optimal loan contract rises and the SM locus rotates clockwise. In the limiting case as entry costs
vanish, the SM locus is horizontal and the interest rate approaches its maximum value given by
Γ(A−1)+1. At the same time, a lower unmatched value for the borrower must be compensated by
a decrease in the loan rate or loan quantity to maintain incentive compatibility and this is captured
16by a counterclockwise rotation of the IC locus. In the limiting case as these entry costs vanish,
the IC locus is horizontal as no contract that oﬀers an interest rate above B will be incentive
compatible. Hence, Case II degenerates to a non-active equilibrium where no optimal loan contract
will be incentive compatible and the credit market fails to function.
Furthermore, recall that Case I captures an active loan market equilibrium with no credit ra-
tioning only if the potential supply of loanable funds (ω)i ss u ﬃciently large. If ω is small then
there may not be any positive rate of interest consistent with the optimal loan contract. However, as
entry costs for borrowers are driven to zero, there will emerge an active non-rationing credit market
equilibrium. If, on the other hand, the economy was initially characterized by the conditional Case
II, possibly with credit rationing, then a removal of entry barriers will lead to a breakdown of the
credit market and non-existence. This situation corresponds to a problem of “over-crowding” in
entry of borrowers with limited loanable funds supply.
6.3 Incentive Frictions
Finally, we investigate the role of moral hazard for credit arrangements in the decentralized market.
We detail how the equilibrium is aﬀected if the cost of absconding is driven down to zero.
Proposition 6. (Incentive Frictions) In the absence of incentive frictions, there only exists an
active, no rationing loanable funds market equilibrium.
Proof: The absence of incentive frictions corresponds to the limiting case where the costs of
absconding as a fraction of total funds, θ → 1. It is immediate from Proposition 1 that for any
given A>1, we can rule out (i) the non-active equilibrium and (ii) the credit rationing equilibrium
with (A − 1) ∈ (1 − θ,2(1 − θ)) = ∅. In the case where (A − 1) > 2(1 − θ), r =
(1−θ)[2δ+μ]
(A−1)−2(1−θ) =0 .
Hence, all r>0 satisﬁes r>r a n di nt h i sc a s et h e r ee x i s t st h ea c t ive, no rationing equilibrium. ¤
Proposition 5 says that the moral hazard problem arising from incentive frictions is crucial
in explaining the existence of both credit rationing and credit market failure. In the presence of
these incentive frictions, search frictions provide a link between market liquidity and credit market
tightness and credit rationing. Finally, borrower entry frictions also play a crucial role in explaining
credit rationing. While the absence of such frictions does not preclude the non-active equilibrium,
it does rule out credit rationing as an equilibrium outcome.
177 Further Discussion
In this section, we examine the duration of incentive compatible loan contracts and consider alter-
native loan default processes.
7.1 Duration of Loan Contracts
An innovative aspect of this our search model of the credit market is that it incorporates a parameter
1
δ that corresponds to the duration of the loan period). For example, in the previous section we
discussed how an increase in the length of the loan contract can aﬀect the incentive compatibility,
the interest rate oﬀer, and the possibility of credit rationing. An interesting application of this
framework would be to study how the duration of the loan contract aﬀects the interest rate oﬀer
and vice versa.
A simple illustration of how the contract’s duration aﬀects the loan rate would be to consider
the active equilibrium without credit rationing (Case I). Here, the optimal contract interest rate is
just given by substituting Q∗ = ω into (12) to get:
δR∗ =[ A −
rv
ω
]Γ +( 1− Γ) (22)
Notice that R∗ > 0 as long as (A − 1) > rv
ω ,w h i c hi ss a t i s ﬁed if the supply of loanable funds ω
or the productivity of the investment project A is suﬃciently large. In this case a decrease in δ,
or increase in the length of the loan contract, increases Γ and hence the optimal loan interest rate
δR∗. One could interpret result as an upward sloping yield curve in (1
δ,δR) space. While beyond
the focus of this paper, it would be of interest in future work to more completely analyze the term
structure properties of a search model of credit.
A related issue would be to extend our model to address the endogenous joint determination of
the quantity, loan rate, and loan contracting period. One way to approach pinning down (Q,δR,δ)
is to have all three objects be the outcome of decentralized bilateral bargaining between lenders
and borrowers. In other words, have them be a solution to a Nash bargaining problem (P) which
maximizes the joint surplus of the lender and borrower:
max
qω,δR,δ
(Jm − Ju)1/2(Πm − Πu)1/2 (P)
s.t. Jm − Ju =
(1 − q)ω + δRqω − rJu
r + δ
and Πm − Πu =
(A − δR)qω − rΠu
r + δ
In addition to the bargaining condition for δR given in (12), we now have an additional ﬁrst order













Because the expression in brackets is equal to zero (Jm − Ju = Πm − Πu), this implies an optimal
choice of δ∗ →∞ . That is, instantaneous credit transactions and separations maximize the joint
surplus of a borrower-lender pair when production is instantaneous at the time of a match. This
result delivers an important message. In our admittedly highly stylized framework, where long-term
relationships only lower search costs but do not alter incentive frictions, there exists no reason to
continue a “long-term” credit relationship. This is because the marginal gain in matched values
from continuing a relationship is dominated by the marginal loss in unmatched values (via the
bargaining threat points). Undoubtedly, adding more realistic features to the model will provide
additional incentive to prolonging credit relationships. For instance, allowing learning and dimin-
ishing incentive frictions over the time agents are matched may yield outcomes that favor long-term
relationships. Although it is beyond the scope of the current paper to go further along this path, we
would like to point out that there is an active literature exploring long-term credit relationships.8
7.2 Alternative Default Processes
The benchmark model above assumes a speciﬁc form of the default process where (i) borrowers
abscond before production and (ii) in addition to the penalty cost θ borrowers who default are
permanently excluded from the credit market. We now consider two alternative setups for the
default process which relaxes these assumptions. It is straightforward to verify that most of the
features and results from our benchmark speciﬁcation remain valid and we highlight some interesting
diﬀerences.
First, following Hart and Moore (1998), borrowers may have the ability to divert returns as
well as assets. In this case production occurs before absconding and the incentive compatibility





In this case, equation (13) is the same except for B∗ = A[1 − (1 − θ)r+δ
r ] <B . This implies that
the IC locus is everywhere below the original IC curve derived above. Hence, the set of incentive
compatible contracts shrinks and credit rationing becomes more likely relative to our benchmark
case.
8 For instance, Hart and Moore (1998) investigate mechanisms and incentives to renegotiate debt contracts in the
face of credit market imperfections and incomplete contracting.
19Second, the Diamond (1990) assumption that the penalty of default is exclusion from the credit
market forever may be viewed as too harsh in light of modern bankruptcy laws. If instead credit





+ Πu ≤ Πm
In this case, the IC locus is upward-sloping as δR ≤ B− rΠu
Q and the uniqueness of the steady state
equilibrium is not guaranteed. In particular, it is possible to have coexistence of a credit rationing
equilibrium and an inactive equilibrium.
8C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
This paper has presented a simple search-theoretic model of the credit market. The model focuses
on endogenous entry and moral hazard as particularly important factors in determining the for-
tunes of entrepreneurs. Our analysis describes the optimal incentive compatible loan contracts and
equilibria that emerge in such an environment. While we tie the extent of mismatch to the tightness
of credit markets, we ﬁnd that mismatch and tightness are somewhat of a “red-herring” for under-
standing the extent of credit rationing; endogenous entry of borrowers can break the conventionally
positive relationship between credit market tightness and credit rationing. We also establish the fol-
lowing regarding the interrelationship between incentive and matching frictions. Incentive frictions
continue to be necessary in accounting for credit rationing and market breakdown. Given these
incentive frictions, both entry and search frictions are important for understanding the possibility
of market breakdown, where credit markets cease to function, while entry frictions are important
for determining the extent of credit rationing.
There are several other possibilities for future work. First, it would be interesting to re-examine
the optimal loan contract and the likelihood of market breakdown in the incomplete contract frame-
work, as in Hart and Moore (1998). To do so, one would need to modify the moral hazard problem.
In particular, rather than absconding, a borrower may “consume” part of the loan without con-
verting that portion into a productive investment project. This loan-eating tendency measures the
degree of shirking, though it cannot be perfectly monitored or veriﬁed by a court of law (due, for
example, to a concurrent change in the state of nature). Then allowing renegotiations of the repay-
ment schedule between the borrower and the lender would not only create more reinforcing forces
between search/entry and incentive frictions, but also make the loan contract more “performance
based,” depending on the realized rate of returns on the investment project. The latter consideration
20may, in turn, lead to a greater likelihood of a long-term borrowing-lending relationship
Second, one might argue there is too much “randomness” in our matching model and that
this randomness exaggerates the moral hazard problem and diminishes the beneﬁt of long-term
relationships. One way to address this issue is to adopt the directed-search price-posting game
developed by Peters (1991). Speciﬁcally, there are two segregated submarkets: market one similar
to the environment in the present paper and market two with lenders requiring borrowers to provide
costly credit documentation prior to granting loans that partially mitigate the incentive frictions.
Since all borrowers are identical ex ante, each lender in each segregated submarket posts for all
borrowers the ﬂow interest rate and the duration of the loan contract to maximize the expected
value subject to a no-arbitrage condition that ensures all borrowers receive equal value ex ante.
As a consequence, the loan contracts are generally diﬀerent between the two submarkets, and free
mobility of borrowers results in diﬀerent matching probabilities and hence diﬀerent measures of
tightness within the two credit markets.
Finally, by incorporating an intertemporal role for ﬁnancial markets in allowing consumers to
smooth consumption over time via endogenous saving decisions, the model can be naturally extended
to explicitly analyze the linkage between credit markets, rationing, and aggregate economic activity.
In particular, our framework may provide a novel approach to understanding how impulses arising
from aggregate and ﬁnancial market shocks are propagated through a decentralized credit channel
via search and entry frictions to explain aggregate ﬂuctuations.
21Appendix
Measure of Credit Market Tightness
An alternative measure of credit market tightness is given by the ratio of unmatched borrowers


























It is easily veriﬁed that κ is monotonically increasing in τ.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1
(i) Consider the case where (A−1) < (1−θ).T h i si m p l i e st h a tB ≡ A−(1−θ)(r+δ
r ) < 1 so that
the IC locus has a horizontal intercept at QIC = δΠu
1−B. Suppose there exists an active loanable
funds equilibrium. This implies: δΠu
1−B = QIC <Q SM = rΠu
A−1,o r , r(1 − B) <δ (A − 1),o rb y
manipulating,
r[(1 − θ) − (A − 1)] <δ [(A − 1) − (1 − θ)] (A1)
Since the right hand side of this expression is negative while the left-hand side is positive, we
have a contradiction. Hence, no active loanable funds equilibrium exists. (Case III)
(ii) Consider the case where (1 − θ) ≤ (A − 1) ≤ 2(1 − θ). From the SM locus given by (12)
notice that limQ→∞ δRSM = Γ(A − 1) + 1. Similarly, from the IC locus given by (13),
limQ→∞ δRIC = B.I f B<1, then from (A1) we know QIC ≤ QSM and there exists
a loanable funds equilibrium. Since the SM locus must cross the IC locus, we have the
credit rationing case where q<1 for ω suﬃciently large. For B>1, we need to verify
that, limQ→∞ δRSM > limQ→∞ δRIC,o r ,Γ(A − 1) + 1 >B , which can be rewritten as:
[
r+δ+μ
2(r+δ)+μ](A − 1) + 1 >A− (1 − θ)(r+δ
r ),o r ,
r[(A − 1) − 2(1 − θ)] < (1 − θ)[2δ + μ] (A2)
Since the right-hand side of (A2) is non-positive and the right-hand side is strictly positive,
this condition holds. Thus, there is a unique credit rationing equilibrium where the SM locus
intersects the IC locus (Case II).
(iii) Consider now (A − 1) > 2(1 − θ).S o l v i n gf o rr in (A2) gives, r<
(1−θ)(2δ+μ)
(A−1)−2(1−θ) ≡ r>0.T h i s
condition is suﬃcient to guarantee that limQ→∞ δRSM > limQ→∞ δRIC and the existence of a
credit rationing equilibrium (Case II). However, if r ≥ r,t h e nlimQ→∞ δRSM ≤ limQ→∞ δRIC
and every loan contract along the SM locus is incentive compatible. The incentive compati-
bility constraint does not bind in this case and there is no rationing (Case I). ¤
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24Chart 1: The Structure of the EconomyFigure 1: Optimal Incentive Compatible Loan Contract (Q = Tq and *R)
Case I:   and    Case II:    and   
           or   
Case III: 
Notes: There are three cases, depending on the relative position of the SM and IC loci:
1. Case I incentive compatibility constraint never binds;
2. Case II incentive compatibility constraint binds only when funds available are high and
in that case, the amount of loan is rationed;
3. Case III   optimal incentive compatible loan contract does not exist. Figure 2: Steady-State Loanable Funds Equilibrium
Figure 3: Equilibrium Responses to a Reduction in Search Frictions (Higher  m0)Figure 3: Multiple Equilibria When Defaulters May Re-enter the Credit Market
 